On Multipolarity
Anarchy, Power, and the Nature of Politics
Welcome back to Endstate! Building on the historical framework I established, this week we will examine the structure of the international system based on the distribution of power and its impact on how states interact with each other. As you’ll recall, multipolarity is when three or more states possess enough power to compete for influence. We’ll go more in-depth than that basic definition today, and hopefully some of you disagree—debate is the point.
We will also discuss the concept of anarchy (very punk rock) and why it forces states to take the distribution—or balance—of power into account. How one measures power, however, is an open question, as is whether or not anarchy is a material fact or a social construct.
Maybe you think we’re still in a unipolar system, perhaps the China-US standoff will coalesce into a rerun of the Cold War, or maybe it’s all just an ideological cover for imperialism—let’s talk, let me know! Multipolarity is already migrating from academia to the media, so having a working knowledge of this concept is key to thinking critically about foreign policy.
Cheers,
Doge
“The texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly…a persistence that one must expect so long as none of the competing units [states] is able to convert the anarchic international realm into a hierarchic one.”
- Political scientist and international relations scholar Kenneth N. Waltz discussing anarchy and the distribution of power in his work Theory of International Politics
On Multipolarity
Absolute Anarchy
Why is history so distressingly violent? Why, despite all the different types of governments and ideologies, do humans continue to organize themselves to compete for territory and resources? While there are many competing theories that claim to answer these questions, one of the most widely accepted and useful concepts is international anarchy and how it forces states to consider their prospects of survival in an uncertain world, where one country can never truly know the intentions of another.
It is important to note that anarchy in this sense does not mean chaos or disorder; rather, it is the lack of a hierarchical structure, no final authority. Ordered relations can and do exist, such as military alliances and trade agreements. The international system differs from our domestic political arrangement in that there is no police force to call when a violation occurs.
While international institutions such as the League of Nations and the UN have been erected to solve this leadership vacuum, they lack independent resources, relying entirely on what member states choose to provide.
Accepting anarchy under conditions of uncertainty as the ordering principle of international relations is key for advancing the rest of our framework, one based on the lack of authority to appeal to when threatened. This is the nature of things the United States sought to change following its ascendency after the Second World War and during the post-Cold War period.
Balance and Perception
The political scientist Kenneth Waltz, in his work Theory of International Politics, described the international system as consisting of two parts: structure and units. Anarchy amid uncertainty is the structure, and it is primarily measured by comparing the material capabilities of the actors—in our case, states.[1]
States with superior technological and economic bases, natural resources, educated and employable populations, and a functioning government apparatus can convert these advantages into military power to pursue greater security at the expense of rivals.
Understanding this material balance is important, but it merely establishes a baseline: how actors are positioned in relation to one another, the balance of power. This relative positioning creates constraints and suggests prudent action, but it is not deterministic.
Subjective factors play a role, because what is the state if not a complex structure of millions of people led by humans whose cognitive processes are just as flawed as the rest of us? As odious as Iraq under Saddam was, misperceptions about his intentions and capabilities, fueled by post-9/11 jingoism, led the United States to invade in 2003. The results of that misadventure are there for all to see.
Despite its dominance, the United States could not lock-in a lasting transformation of global order: we remain hemmed-in by anarchy, a problem exacerbated by the cognitive limitations of humans. Under multipolarity, the opportunities for miscalculation and crisis expand as competing centers of power emerge.
Yet structure alone cannot explain the persistence of rivalry. To understand why peace remains elusive, we must confront the nature of politics itself.
The Nature of Politics and Threats
“Politics,” insists international relations theorist John Mearsheimer, “is a deeply competitive and potentially violent enterprise,” one driven, he argues, by fundamental disagreements over belief systems and interests—conflicts that are often unresolvable.[2] Domestically, we construct states to mediate between these competing impulses. Internationally, no such structure exists.
Anarchy, then, is not merely an abstract material condition; it is a consequence of the competing visions of what the “good life” is, and how secure a state feels compared to the threats it sees in the international landscape.
A state’s subjective interpretation of a rival’s intentions, alongside its relative power and geographic proximity, is called the balance of threat, a term coined by Stephen Walt of Harvard’s Kennedy School. It is useful for its synthesis of both material and perceptive factors. The closer and more threatening a country appears, the more likely others will arm themselves against it and seek alliances.[3]
Consider the current situation in Asia. While China is the primary economic partner of most countries in the region, its attempts to control the South China Sea and subsequent military buildup causes others to form defense partnerships with the United States as a hedge. As powerful and domineering as the United States is and can be, it isn’t next door.
This sort of hedging behavior, where a state’s aims appear to be completely at odds, will become increasingly more common as the multipolar world takes shape and the conversation shifts away from simply being about the rivalry between China and the United States.
A Note on Theory: What’s with all the academics?
The story I’ve conveyed so far is grounded in the realist tradition of international relations theory. You should know, however, that there are several competing frameworks that seek to explain how the international system works. Liberalism and constructivism, for instance, take different views of anarchy—liberals argue that its effects can be mitigated through institutions and interdependence, while constructivists suggest that anarchy is not a material condition at all, but a social construct.
The framework we’ll use moving forward is mostly realist, with allowances for human agency in the short term, bounded by the constraints of anarchy and the pursuit of security.
I like realism because it strips away illusions, both about ourselves and about the world. We tend to think we’re righteous, that we mean well, and that our opinions are morally correct. But ideals do not survive because of their intrinsic value; they survive because those who believe in them have the means to make them stick.
The implication for the universality of American values—such as democracy and individual rights—is that they were not inevitable outcomes of history, but products of a specific historical moment. That should prompt a fundamental reevaluation of what we believe to be true, and how we are willing to exercise the power of the state.
Theories are not merely academic exercises. Whenever someone must decide on a complex issue with limited information, which is most of the time, that decision relies on assumptions about likely outcomes. Whether formally named or not, that is theory in action.
Theory to Reality: Post-Unipolar Geopolitics
Realist theory is vital to understanding contemporary geopolitics because it focuses on the distribution of power. The ongoing redistribution of power internationally is at the core of our present circumstance and navigating it without calamity requires an appreciation of that fact.
Thinking about American foreign policy can no longer revolve around outdated assumptions. Attempts to recreate the liberal order as it existed prior to 2016 by erecting an axis of “autocracies versus democracies” is doomed to failure, as the United States no longer possesses the power to universally enforce its ideology. This line of thinking also ignores the rising tide of nationalism that objects to liberal norms.
Likewise, recent attempts by the current administration to carve out spheres of influence with fellow strongmen in China, Russia, and other states will not result in a stronger America untethered by international institutions. These institutions, as I explained in the previous edition of this newsletter, existed to cement the world order to the United States and expand its influence. By abandoning them, the United States encourages states around the world to adhere to the logic of anarchy and begin seeking security in their home regions and all that entails, the worst consequence of all being war.
Finally, while competition among great powers—the United States, China, Russia, a rearming Europe, and a rising India—will significantly impact global stability, it is not the only factor. The Great Convergence, coupled with rapid economic and technological changes, has empowered numerous “middle powers” to assert regional influence and exert international leverage. These states command critical resources, military capabilities, geographic advantages such as maritime chokepoints, and growing clout in international institutions.
Countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea, Israel, and Saudi Arabia have become geopolitical pivot states, determined to advance their interests while aligning selectively with great powers.
This intricate web of conflicting interests and values will simultaneously drive fragmentation while preserving an interconnected, globalized world — albeit one that is more conflict prone, vulnerable, and focused on narrow groupings of countries and regions as opposed to large-scale projects in global governance.
Recommended Readings and What’s Spinning
Stephen Walt is back (you’ll notice a trend on that), and his book The Origins of Alliances is truly key for understanding balance of threat theory. It’s great for examining regional dynamics — what if, for example, the US did not support Taiwan? Would other countries in the region capitulate to China? According to Walt’s theory, probably not, and they would align with the US even harder. It’s the sort of thinking that could save us from an unnecessary war.
Emma Ashford of the Stimson Center discusses best practices for measuring and argues that multipolarity won’t be that dangerous because most conflicts will not be great power wars.
🎧 Written to the backdrop of Salty Eyes by Kerosene Heights, an emo band from Asheville, NC. It’s not a phase, mom! 🎧
[1] Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), [page number].
[2] John J. Mearsheimer, “War in International Politics,” International Security 49, no. 4 (Spring 2025): 11.
[3] Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).